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I.  Introduction 
In this paper we intend to answer at least three questions.  First, why is the market 
share of U.S. or Anglo-American cultural goods so high in other cultures, and rising?  
Second, why is cultural trade different from other trade in its welfare implications – or is 
it?  Third, what are the likely effects of policies adopted to protect domestic cultural 
goods production?  Our answers to these questions will lead to specific proposals 
regarding policy reforms in the area of international trade in cultural goods. 
Like others, we will argue that part of the reason for U.S. dominance in cultural 
goods is the home market effect (Helpman and Krugman 1985, section 10.4).  The home 
market effect results from the interaction of transportation costs with increasing returns to 
scale in a model of trade in differentiated products.  Transportation costs for cultural 
goods such as film and music are negligible, but as Hoskins et al. (1997) have pointed 
out, their place is taken by the “cultural discount” that consumers apply to cultural goods 
from a different culture.  
However, we question whether the standard home market effect alone can explain 
the extent of U.S. dominance in cultural goods.  Table 1 shows that in 2002 the median 
U.S. cinema market share across three large European and two Asian countries was 63 
percent and the median ratio of the U.S. to national cinema market share was 2.9.  The 
U.S. cinema market share rivals the U.S. market share of roughly 70 percent (in 1998) in 
large commercial jet aircraft (Pavcnik 2002), which may be the highest U.S. market share 
for any well-defined commercial manufactured product.  We lack data for the Anglo-
American share of the popular music market, but we suspect that it is also unusually high, 
though probably not as high as the U.S. film market share (Economist 1998). 
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U.S. or Anglo-American dominance could be explained by network externalities 
in cultural goods consumption.  Many writers have recognized the social nature of 
cultural goods consumption (Cowen 2002, pp. 107-8; Eaton, Pendakur, and Reed 2003).  
Traditionally these social interactions have taken place within a culture, but falling 
communication and transportation costs, student exchanges, and most recently internet 
chat rooms and music file-sharing have increased social interactions across cultures.  It is 
no surprise then that the U.S. cultural market share is increasing, as reflected in the 
cinema market shares reported in Table 1.  If everyone communicates equally with 
everyone else the standard of the larger country will tend to take over, whereas there is 
more possibility for “niche” production to survive if groups are isolated from 
communicating with each other and have different underlying preferences. 
Janeba (2004) sees consumption of cultural goods as an input to production of 
national “identity,” giving rise to special welfare implications of cultural goods trade.  In 
contrast, from a static point of view we treat trade in cultural goods as being no different 
than trade in any consumption network externality good, such as computer software.  We 
emphasize instead a difference in the dynamic welfare implications of such trade.  As in 
Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), we argue that production of current 
cultural goods generates ideas that spill over to future cultural goods production.  We also 
make the crucial assumptions that producers of cultural goods have access to the ideas 
generated by past cultural goods production of all cultures, and that ideas of different 
cultures are imperfect substitutes. 
There can be little doubt that producers of commercially lucrative cultural goods 
are influenced by ideas from other cultures.  This is true of producers in the dominant 
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culture as well.  For example, the “film noir” style, considered by many to be the most 
enduring achievement of 1940s Hollywood, was heavily influenced by German 
expressionist cinema.1  George Lucas spent months in Japan in the early 1970s soaking 
up Japanese films before creating Star Wars, which borrows many key elements directly 
from the work of the great Japanese director Akira Kurosawa.2  In music, it is universally 
acknowledged that Anglo-American “rock and roll” grew out of “rhythm and blues,” a 
musical style of African-Americans in the U.S. South (see, e.g., Stuessy 1990) that in turn 
has its roots in West Africa.3   The Beatles then led a revolution in rock and roll while 
under the influence of the European avant-garde, especially the electronic music of 
Karlheinz Stockhausen.4 
The imperfect substitutability of ideas from different cultures in production of 
new cultural goods is a more controversial assumption, and it has the crucial implication 
that the ideas that spill over from the cultural goods production of the subordinate 
culture(s) are more valuable because they are more scarce.   Cultural scholars categorize 
film and music by national or cultural/linguistic “schools” or genres, each of which has a 
set of recognizable characteristics.5  It stands to reason, then, that a producer of new film 
                                                 
1 Hirsch (1981, p. 53) writes, “The cinematic origins of film noir can be traced to the German Expressionist 
films of the late 1910s and twenties”.  Double Indemnity (1944) is one of the signature Hollywood films in 
this style. 
2 Baxter (1999, p. 73) states, “Lucas loved the formalized sword-duels of Kurosawa’s historical films….No 
less attractive were his themes:  loyalty to a lord; honor; mutual respect among warriors; fidelity to 
bushido, the samurai code.” 
3 Evans (2002, pp. 23-24) describes the influences of African music on the harmony, instrumentation, and 
even subject matter of rhythm and blues songs. 
4 Everett (1999, p. 10) writes that Paul McCartney “introduced the Beatles to the worlds of Stockhausen 
and Bach, leading to a revolution in the expressive capacity of mainstream rock music.”  Stockhausen 
appears in the crowd on the celebrated cover of Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band. 
5 For example, Thomas (1985), writing about “Indian popular cinema,” states, “What seems to emerge in 
Hindi cinema is an emphasis on emotion and spectacle rather than tight narrative, on how things will 
happen rather than what will happen next, on a succession of modes rather than linear denouement, on 
familiarity and repeated viewings rather than ‘originality’ and novelty, on a moral disordering to be 
(temporarily) resolved rather than an enigma to be solved.”  Slonimsky (1997, p. 29) states of “Arab 
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or music will get ideas from watching, listening to, and studying the film or music of 
other cultures that are qualitatively different from the ideas he absorbs from the film or 
music of his own culture. 6 
At first glance our argument suggests that, by preserving cultural diversity, 
protection of cultural goods production can generate dynamic welfare gains that offset the 
static welfare losses it causes.7  To understand the likely long-term effects of protection, 
however, we turn to a cultural good for which the rest of the world does not fear U.S. or 
Western dominance, but quite the opposite:  clothing.  Clothing is not only an integral 
part of culture but also a consumption network externality good par excellence:  people 
are more comfortable when they are dressed like those around them.  Perhaps as a result, 
Western clothing appears to have achieved a market share outside of the West 
comparable to the U.S. cinema market share, despite its occasional inappropriateness (as 
millions of necktie-wearing tropical businessmen and office workers will attest).  At the 
same time, clothing was the lead industry in import-substituting industrialization 
throughout the world, and now the Western share of clothing production is far smaller 
than the Western share of clothing style. 
The example of clothing shows that the long-term effect of protection is not likely 
to be preservation of cultural diversity but rather imitation of the goods produced by the 
dominant culture, as producers in other cultures respond to the demand created by 
                                                                                                                                                 
music” that “The traditional music of Arab nations of the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf basins differs so 
greatly from the nature of Western music that transcription with any degree of fidelity into Western 
notation is fraught with difficulties….The melodies themselves register to a Western-trained ear as 
progressions of quarter tones, semitones, and other divisions of a whole tone.” 
6 In our model, we will assume that the same set of ideas processed through an Indian or Arab “sensibility” 
yields Indian film or Arab music rather than U.S. film or music.  We argue that the same cannot be said of a 
spreadsheet program, for example, which will be no more different from other spreadsheet programs than if 
it had been designed by U.S. software producers. 
7 Ottaviano and Peri (2004) find evidence that cultural diversity makes U.S. cities more productive. 
 5
consumption network externalities.  An excellent example is provided by the experience 
of Argentina in the 1990s.  Under the Menem regime, heavy state subsidies were 
provided to domestic film production.  Content was deregulated but participation of 
domestic television stations was encouraged to insure commercial viability of output.  
The result was the production of films such as Comodines (Cops), billed as “the first 
Hollywood-style movie spoken in Spanish,” and a smash hit in Argentina (Falicov 2000, 
p. 330). 
Ironically, the Argentine experience also points towards the policy 
recommendations generated by our model.  As in the 1990s under Menem, in the 1980s 
under Alfonsín Argentina provided state subsidies to domestic film production, but 
projects were chosen “with an international film festival audience in mind, rather than a 
domestic one” (Falicov 2000, p. 334).  This maximized the spillover of ideas from 
Argentine film output while allowing Argentine consumers to enjoy the consumption 
network externalities from U.S. films.  What made this policy package unsustainable, of 
course, was that the main beneficiaries were not the Argentine taxpayers who were 
financing the subsidies.  We shall recommend that if this kind of policy package is to be 
sustained, the foreigners who reap most of the benefits will have to bear more of the 
subsidy burden. 
To support the intuition presented here and generate additional results, in the next 
section we will develop a model of international trade in differentiated products subject 
to consumption network externalities.  The static part of our model should apply equally 
well to non-cultural goods subject to such externalities, such as computer software.  We 
believe that the dynamic part and the policy implications that flow from it only apply to 
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trade in cultural goods, however.  In section III we derive both positive and normative 
results for our basic model.  We add the possibility of imitative cultural goods production 
in section IV.   In our concluding section we explore the lessons that our model and 
results provide for cultural policy. 
 
II. The Model 
 Our model builds upon the well-known home market effect model of Helpman 
and Krugman (1985, section 10.4), and we will adopt their notation where convenient.  
There are two industries, one producing a differentiated product and the other a 
homogeneous product.  We will call the differentiated product industry the cultural goods 
industry.  We assume Cobb-Douglas utility for the two goods, yielding constant 
expenditure shares, and we will let the sub-utility for cultural goods take the standard 
CES form.  There are two countries, home and foreign. We distinguish all foreign 
consumption with an asterisk, and all foreign production with a tilde (thus, for example, 
*C  will denote foreign consumption of the home cultural good, whileC~  is home 
consumption of the foreign cultural good).  Production technology is identical across 
countries, but the cultures of each country are distinct.  There is one factor of production, 
which we shall call labor.   
 The homogeneous good is costlessly tradable and both countries produce it when 
there is trade.  It is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, 
which ensures that the wage rate w will be the same in both countries.  Letting the 
homogeneous good be the numeraire and assuming (without loss of generality) that each 
unit requires one unit of labor to produce, we have w = w* = 1 in equilibrium.  Cultural 
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goods are produced under increasing returns to scale, with a fixed cost and constant 
marginal cost, in a monopolistic competition setting. 
 Our first change to the Helpman-Krugman model is that we assume that cultural 
goods are costlessly transportable, but they are subject to a “cultural discount” by 
domestic consumers.  This change proves to be only notational, i.e., the cultural discount 
in our model is equivalent to the “ice” transportation cost in the Helpman-Krugman 
model.  Our second change is to assume that the utility from consuming cultural goods is 
augmented by consumption network externalities, which we will specify below. Our third 
change is to assume that the utility from consumption of cultural goods is also augmented 
by the quality of cultural goods production, which in turn is a function of past cultural 
goods production through spillover of ideas.  
 These three changes are incorporated into the utility function of the representative 
home country consumer:  
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where τ indexes time; Cy is the consumption of the homogeneous good by the 
representative home country consumer; iC and jC
~ are the consumptions by the home 
consumer of varieties i and j of the home and foreign cultural good, respectively; δ is the 
cultural discount rate, where we assume that 10 << δ ; H and H~ measure the 
consumption network externalities enjoyed by consuming home and foreign cultural 
goods, respectively; n and ñ are the number of varieties of home and foreign cultural 
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good that are produced, respectively; Q is the quality of cultural goods production; r is 
the time discount rate; 10 << ρ ; and 10 <<α .  In equation (1), τu is the instantaneous 
utility at time τ , and tU is total utility, discounted to time t. 
 The utility of the representative foreign country consumer is symmetric to 
equation (1) and can be written as follows:   
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where the notation is in all respects analogous to equation (1). Note that the assumption 
of equal cultural discounting by home and foreign consumers is made for notational 
simplicity, and does not qualitatively affect our results. 
 Equations (1) and (2) incorporate the assumption that the quality of all cultural 
goods production is the same across the two countries, implying that the ideas generated 
by production of past cultural goods have the same spillover to both home and foreign 
producers. Thus, the model works as if all cultural goods producers attend the same 
international film and music festivals, making the ideas from past cultural production a 
global public good.  We could easily let each country’s producers give more weight to the 
ideas generated by past production in their own country without qualitatively changing 
our results, but we maintain symmetry for simplicity.   
 For the quality of current period production of cultural goods we specifically 
assume:  
 Qτ = Q(nτ-1, 1~ −τn ).        (3) 
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Equation (3) incorporates two important additional assumptions.  First, ideas generated 
by past production of home and foreign varieties of cultural goods are imperfect 
substitutes in production of current cultural good quality, as we argued in our 
introduction.  We assume this implies that the marginal product of an additional past 
variety of a country is increasing with the relative scarcity of that country’s past varieties.  
Second, current cultural goods quality depends only on varieties produced in the 
immediately preceding period; there is no accumulation of ideas that would cause cultural 
goods quality to increase over time.8  This means that there is no state variable in the 
model, and we can drop the time subscript to simplify notation. 
 Given the symmetry with which both home and foreign varieties of cultural good 
enter the utility function of the representative consumer for the home or foreign country, 
demand by either consumer will be identical across home or foreign varieties.  This 
allows us to define consumption network externalities compactly, thereby completing the 
specification of our model:  
 )( *nDnDHH γ+≡ , )~~~~(~ *DnDnHH γ+≡ ,  
 )( ** nDnDHH +≡ γ , )~~~~(~ ** DnDnHH +≡ γ ,     (4) 
where D is aggregate demand for a given variety of cultural good, with an asterisk 
denoting demand by foreign consumers and a tilde denoting demand for foreign varieties. 
In equation (4), γ is a parameter such that 0 < γ < 1, and H(.) is an increasing function of 
its argument, with the normalization H(0) = 1.  There are two key features of our 
                                                 
8 Thus, cultural goods producers in our model are only influenced by “fresh ideas.”  In reality, current 
cultural goods producers may also get ideas from archived film and music, for example, nearly all of which 
loses relevance with time.  Allowing for less than 100 percent depreciation of cultural ideas after two 
periods would mean that the impact on future cultural goods quality of changes in current numbers of 
varieties of cultural goods being produced would unfold more slowly. 
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specification.  First, consumption network externalities are stronger within a country than 
across countries, with the extent of cross-country externalities determined by γ, a 
parameter that we can think of as measuring “globalization.”  Second, externalities for 
any variety depend not only on consumption of that individual variety but also on 
consumption of all “compatible” varieties, i.e., varieties produced within the same 
culture. 
This second feature may be controversial.  We argue that a major reason why film 
is socially consumed is that people like to discuss the films they see.  Discussion will 
often involve comparison with other, similar films, so enjoyment of any given film is 
enhanced by the extent to which similar films have been seen by the participants in the 
discussion.  Music needs to be compatible to be programmed by DJs at events and on the 
radio and for dance music at parties, so again, demand for any given piece of music is 
enhanced by the extent to which similar music is consumed by others.  In other words, 
compatible films and music create a social context within which a given film or piece of 
music is consumed, without which it is less enjoyable.  Obviously, the symmetry across 
all varieties in our consumption network externality specification is unrealistic:  
externalities will be stronger within than across genres (action-adventure versus romantic 
comedy, country-western versus rock), and stronger for the variety in question than for 
other compatible varieties.  Incorporating these complications would not qualitatively 
affect our results, provided that each individual producer is still too small to affect the 
sum of consumption network externalities for its variety of cultural good. 
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III. Model Solution and Results 
It is easy to show that we obtain the standard CES demands for cultural goods, 
which are therefore given by: 
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Here σ ≡ 1/(1-ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the cultural 
good, p is the price of any variety in either country in monopolistic competition 
equilibrium, T equals one plus the tariff rate that the foreign country may impose on 
cultural goods, and L and L* are both the home and foreign country labor forces, 
respectively, and the home and foreign country consumer incomes (recall that 1~ == ww ).  
For simplicity we have assumed that the government spends all tariff revenue on the 
homogeneous product.  In monopolistic competition equilibrium, p will be fixed by the 
constant markup and the constant wage (which determines a constant marginal cost).  
Note that cultural goods quality Q drops out of the demand for cultural goods. This 
occurs because the Cobb-Douglas specification of the utility function makes αQ  a shifter 
of the entire level of utility.  Therefore, αQ  is only used when we discuss the welfare 
implications of the model. 
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 As in the Helpman-Krugman model, the output of any variety in monopolistic 
competition is fixed and equal across countries.  Denoting this output by x, we have two 
market clearing conditions: 
 D + D* = x, 
 D~  + *~D  = x.         (6) 
 Equations (5) and (6) treat demand and supply for cultural goods such as film and 
music analogously to demand and supply for cultural goods such as clothing, in that the 
price paid by consumers and marginal cost incurred by producers is positive.  This is not 
a problem if film is consumed by purchasing DVDs and music is consumed by 
purchasing CDs, but would seem inapplicable to music heard on the radio, for example.  
We argue nevertheless that the “price” to consumers of listening to music on the radio is 
still positive provided that consumers have a positive opportunity cost of time, so that 
demand measured in listening time is still described by equations analogous to equations 
(5).  Moreover, revenue received by producers is proportional to the number of listeners 
through royalty agreements, and producers must still cover their fixed costs of 
production, to which x is proportional.  In short, we argue that equilibrium conditions that 
are qualitatively equivalent to equations (6) (i.e., yield the same economic behavior) 
would emerge from a fully specified model of any cultural goods market in which 
intellectual property rights are fully protected, as we shall assume throughout this paper. 
Equations (5) and (6) give us six equations in the six unknowns:  n, ñ, D, D~ , D*, 
and *~D .  If the function H were identically one, the model would reduce to the Helpman-
Krugman model.  Indeed, we will need to place some restrictions on the function H in 
order to ensure that our model behaves enough like the Helpman-Krugman model to 
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admit a unique interior equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium where there is positive production 
of cultural goods in both countries and where the corner solutions that often occur in 
models with externalities are ruled out. 9  In such an equilibrium, not only do both market 
clearing equations (6) hold but also D + D* > x when the model is evaluated at n = 0 and 
D~  + *~D  > x when ñ = 0, so that corner equilibria are eliminated by entry. 
 The first restriction on the function H needed to ensure the existence of an 
interior equilibrium is that it is bounded from above by 1/δ.  To see why, combine the 
two market-clearing conditions to obtain: 
 D - D~  = *~D - D*. 
Substituting equations (5) for the demands in the equation above and eliminating p and α 
yields: 
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Now suppose that ñ approaches zero, so that 1~,~ * →HH . Then **~ DD −  (the right-hand 
side of the equation above) approaches a positive term times 1* )(1 −− σδH . Therefore, we 
need *H < δ1 , since *DD −  (the left-hand side of the equation) is certainly positive.  
The intuition for this restriction is that if positive production of cultural goods is going to 
be possible in the foreign (small) country, the consumption network externality cannot 
increase the desirability of the home cultural goods sufficiently to more than offset the 
cultural discount. 
 The second restriction we need to place on the function H is that its derivative not 
                                                 
9 Multiple specialized equilibria (“standards”) are a common feature of models with network externalities 
(see, e.g., Church and Gandal 1992). 
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be too large, a restriction made more precise in the proofs of the various propositions 
below.  To see the need for this restriction, consider the condition D + D* > x when the 
model is evaluated at n = 0, which rules out the existence of a corner equilibrium in 
which only the foreign country produces cultural goods (analysis of the other corner 
equilibrium is symmetric).  As entry occurs and n rises, H and H* increase, tending to 
raise D and D* by equations (5) and stimulate more entry, driving the economy to the 
opposite corner equilibrium.  Working against this self-reinforcing mechanism is the fact 
that each additional home variety diverts home demand from other home varieties more 
than it diverts foreign demand from foreign varieties, because foreign spending on home 
varieties is reduced by the cultural discount.  Thus the increase in consumption network 
externalities that occurs as the number of home varieties consumed increases must be 
dominated by the tendency to diversify consumption induced by the cultural discount, 
requiring the derivative of H to be sufficiently small. 10   
 With these restrictions on the function H in place, we can begin to simplify the 
system of six equations in six unknowns given by (5) and (6).  First, we use the 
accounting identities that consumer spending on home and foreign cultural goods equals 
their total expenditures on cultural goods: 
LDpnnpD α=+ ~~        (7) 
*)~(~)( LDxpnDxnpT α=−+− ,     (8) 
where we have substituted the market clearing conditions (6) into equation (8). 
Then equations (7) and (8) can be “solved” for n and ñ: 
                                                 
10 In numerical simulations of our model we used the function H(a) = (b + a/δ)/(b + a), which allows us to 
make the derivative of H as small as necessary by increasing b. 
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 Equations (9) are not true solutions for n and ñ, since there are endogenous 
variables on the right-hand sides.  However, they do provide a substitution rule for the 
numbers of varieties produced in the home and foreign countries.  Since the market 
clearing conditions (6) further allow the substitution for D* and *~D  everywhere, we are 
left with only two endogenous variables, namely home demands for the representative 
home and foreign varieties, D and D~ . To close the analysis, we must obtain a system of 
two equations in those two variables. We do so by performing the substitutions described 
above into the demand equations (5), which after some simplification yields: 
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where all substitutions are implicit inside the arguments of the H functions, and we have 
introduced the following re-parameterizations of the country sizes: ,*LLy +≡   
.*LL
Lz +≡  Thus y denotes the size of the world, whereas z denotes the share of the 
larger (home) country, so that 12/1 <≤ z . We have also defined the functions 
( ) 1~),,,~,( −≡ σδγ HHzyDDA  and ( ) 1**~),,,~,( −≡ σδγ HHzyDDB  for future reference. 
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 In the Helpman-Krugman model, if the relative size of the home country z is 
sufficiently great production of varieties in the foreign country goes to zero, so that 
equilibrium with positive numbers of varieties produced in both countries only obtains 
for a restricted range of z.  Our first proposition shows that such an upper bound for the 
relative home country size also exists in our model, and, more importantly, that this upper 
bound decreases with γ, implying that globalization causes cultural goods production to 
disappear from increasingly large foreign countries.  Intuitively, increases in relative 
home country size and increased globalization both reduce demand for the cultural goods 
of the foreign (smaller) country relative to the home country, so increasing γ decreases 
the relative home country size necessary to eliminate foreign cultural goods production 
entirely. 
Proposition 1:  Given sufficiently strong cultural discounting (lowδ ), a non-prohibitive 
tariff (finite T),  and an upper bound on consumption network externalities H that is 
independent of δ , there exists a “region of cultural diversity” for the home (larger) 
country share of the world labor force.  Specifically, there exists a unique )(γHz such 
that n, ñ > 0 for z≤2/1 < )(γHz  and n > 0, ñ = 0 for z ≥ )(γHz .  Moreover, )(' γHz  < 0.  
 
All propositions are proved in the Appendix. 11  The region of cultural diversity in (z,γ) 
space is shown in Figure 1, where the dashed line and notations )(1 γHz  and 
)(2 γHz should be ignored for now. 
 Our next proposition states that within the region of cultural diversity a solution 
for our model exists and is unique. 
Proposition 2:  Given z≤2/1 < )(γHz , there exist unique positive values of D, D~ , D*, 
*~D , n, and ñ that solve equations (6), (9), (10), and (11). 
                                                 
11 Since the proof of Proposition 1 uses the potential to makeδ arbitrarily small, we need a bound on H 
other than 1/δ .  This is a technical rather than a substantive assumption and is not needed (or used) in any 
of our numerical simulations cited below. 
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The basis for this proposition can be found in Figure 2, which shows equations 
(10) and (11), labeled “home consumption schedule” and “foreign consumption 
schedule,” respectively.  The figure depicts a square of side x, its horizontal edge 
representing the total production of a typical home variety, and its vertical edge 
representing the total production of the typical foreign variety.  Home consumptions D 
and D~  are measured from the origin O and therefore foreign consumptions 
DxD −=* and DxD ~~* −=  are measured from the origin O*.  A point in the figure 
therefore represents the allocation of the typical home variety and of the typical foreign 
variety between the home and the foreign representative consumers.  The restrictions H < 
δ1  and H ′not too large ensure that the slope of the home (foreign) consumption 
schedule is less (greater) than one and that the schedules are close to straight lines, 
because any curvature must come from changes in the H functions with respect to their 
arguments. 
We are now ready for comparative static analysis of the interior equilibrium of 
our model.  We first show that the standard home market effect obtains in our model.  
This is important because we argued in our introduction that increased globalization 
reinforces the home market effect in the presence of consumption network externalities.  
From equations (9), we can write the ratio between ñ and n as follows: 
.~
)1(
)(~
)(~),,(
*
*
Dzx
TzxzTzD
LLDLx
TLxLTLD
n
nTzR −
−−+=+−
−+=≡γ   (12) 
It is then straightforward to show that this ratio decreases with the home country share of 
the world labor force. 
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Proposition 3:  Given z≤2/1 < )(γHz , we obtain ∂ R(z,γ,T)/∂ z < 0 , the home market 
effect. 
 
We can now go on to state a proposition that the ratio of foreign to home varieties 
of cultural goods produced in equilibrium decreases as globalization increases.  However, 
unlike Proposition 1 showing that increased globalization causes cultural goods 
production to disappear from increasingly large countries, we can only prove our 
proposition on R if there is no protection of foreign cultural goods (T = 1).  Recall that the 
intuition for our result is that with n > ñ we expect that increased γ should have more 
impact on consumption network externalities for home than foreign goods (see equation 
4).  But protection of foreign cultural goods (T > 1) can actually yield n < ñ, raising the 
possibility that the impact of globalization will be reversed and that increased γ will raise 
rather than reduce the relative number of foreign varieties. 12  With this caveat, we state: 
Proposition 4:  Given z≤2/1 < )(γHz , we obtain ∂ R(z,γ,T=1)/∂ γ < 0. 
 
 Proposition 4 implies that the welfare effects of increased globalization are 
ambiguous.  Higher γ implies higher consumption network externalities, unambiguously 
increasing consumer utility in the current period.  However, higher γ also reduces the 
ratio of relatively scarce foreign varieties to relatively abundant home varieties of cultural 
goods.  At the same time, the total number of varieties is fixed given T = 1:  from 
equations (7) and (8) we have pxLLpxDxTLLnn )]([)])(1()([~ ** +=−−−+=+ αα , so 
the absolute number of foreign varieties must decline as γ increases.   If foreign varieties 
are sufficiently scarce initially, the quality of future cultural goods given by equation (3) 
must fall.  Consequently, the welfare of the representative consumer in both countries 
                                                 
12 We have confirmed this possibility using numerical simulations. 
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could decrease if the rate of time discount is sufficiently small.  A fall in welfare of the 
representative home consumer could be termed “cultural blowback.” 13 
 In addition to predictions regarding the impact of increased globalization, our 
model can make predictions concerning market shares for cultural goods that differ in the 
extent to which they are socially consumed.  These will be cross-sectional rather than 
time-series predictions.  Propositions 5 and 6 are the analogues of Propositions 1 and 4, 
respectively.   
Proposition 5:  Suppose that the assumptions of Proposition 1 hold. Consider two types 
of cultural goods, 1 and 2, such that H1(c) > H2(c).  That is, good 1 has stronger 
consumption network externalities than good 2.  Let us label the solutions for the model 
in the two cases by the subscripts 1 and 2.  Then the maximum z that is consistent with ñ 1 
> 0 is smaller than the maximum z that is consistent with ñ 2 > 0:  production will 
disappear from a larger foreign country when the cultural goods have stronger 
consumption network externalities. 
 
Proposition 5 implies that as the externality becomes stronger, the region of cultural 
diversity shrinks as shown in Figure 1, where we now make use of two cultural diversity 
frontiers:  the outside frontier, labeled )(2 γHz , refers to the weaker externality, and the 
inside frontier, labeled )(1 γHz , refers to the stronger externality.  This shift of the cultural 
diversity frontier is useful in the proof of the next proposition, which also requires that 
H1(c) - H2(c) is not too large, analogous to our standard restriction on H ′ . 
Proposition 6:  Suppose that the assumptions of Proposition 4 hold, including T = 1. 
Consider two types of cultural goods, 1 and 2, such that H1(c) > H2(c).  Let us label the 
ratios of  ñ to n in the two cases by R1(z,γ,T=1) and R2(z,γ,T=1).  If H1(c) - H2(c) is not 
too large, then R1(z,γ,T=1) < R2(z,γ,T=1). 
 
                                                 
13 It is tempting to see the current creative travails of Hollywood as evidence that this is already taking 
place.  One critic (Elliott 2005) wrote of the 2005 summer season, “When retreads so dominate the box 
office, it says Hollywood is open for business in much the same spirit as Forest Lawn – only the dead and 
recycled seem truly served,” and director Terry Gilliam stated, “I know when I watch trailers, that I’m 
seeing the same ones I’ve seen the last 15 years….Maybe the public is waking up that they’re watching the 
same film again.”  We prefer to note cautiously that cultural creativity, like macroeconomic time series, 
displays cycles as well as trends. 
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The most promising way to test Propositions 5 or 6 is to look within a category of 
cultural goods for types that clearly differ in the extent to which the social aspect of 
consumption is important.  This will hold constant as many confounding factors (e.g., 
comparative advantage and trade costs) as possible.  For example, we would predict that 
the market share of Western clothing would be greater for business attire than for 
sleepwear.  An especially interesting comparison is film versus television.  Even 
primetime television is less viewed and discussed with individuals outside the home than 
are films, on average.  The consensus view among media scholars is that the U.S. share of 
foreign television viewing, even for primetime, is far below the U.S. share of foreign 
cinema admissions.14  Unfortunately, systematic ratings data giving market shares of U.S. 
and foreign programming are unavailable or expensive for most countries.  We know that 
the U.S. audience share for the largest commercial network in S. Korea has fluctuated 
between 5 and 13 percent during the period 1992-2002 (Chung 2003), compared to a 
2002 cinema market share of 49 percent in Table 1.  An article in Variety (Johnson 2003) 
notes, “A recent survey by Nielsen Media Research found that 71% of the top ten 
programs in 60 countries were locally produced.”  As an example of the cultural 
specificity to which local producers cater, the article cites the popularity of “religious 
fiction” in Italy:  “Hardly a week goes by without a spiritual offering in primetime, a 
series or made-for based on the Bible or the lives of popes and saints.  The latest example 
of religious fiction was dedicated to the saint Maria Goretti and drew 10 million viewers 
(a 35% share).” 
These cross-sectional predictions are not implied by an explanation of increasing 
                                                 
14 Straubhaar (2002, p. 197) states, “As ratings in many countries reflect, audiences usually tend to prefer 
local programming when they can get it.” 
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U.S. or Anglo-American cultural market shares over time that is based on falling rates of 
cultural discount, which helps to distinguish this explanation from our explanation based 
on consumption network externalities.  Another distinction between these two 
explanations can be seen from equations (10) and (11):  increasing δ  increases each 
country’s consumption of the other country’s representative variety relative to its own 
variety equally, whereas increasing γ tends to increase the smaller country’s consumption 
of the larger country’s representative variety more relative to its own variety, because n > 
ñ in the H functions. 15 
In order to increase their cultural goods market shares, countries around the world 
such as Australia, Canada, France, and S. Korea have turned to protectionist measures 
such as requiring that a minimum percentage of total domestic screen time or of each 
broadcaster’s programming be domestic content (Hoskins et al. 1997).  For the remainder 
of this section we investigate the effects of the ad valorem tariff imposed by the foreign 
country on imports of home cultural goods, which can be thought of as the tariff 
equivalent of a quantitative restriction.  As can be seen from equations (10) and (11), an 
increase in T directly increases the slope of the foreign consumption schedule in Figure 2 
and otherwise affects the home and foreign consumption schedules only through the H 
functions.  Given our restrictions on the H functions the dominant effect will be that 
illustrated by the dashed line in Figure 2, leading to an increase in both D and D~ .  
Proposition 7 shows that these increases dominate the direct effect of T in equation (12), 
so that the number of foreign varieties rises relative to the number of home varieties: 
                                                 
15 We cannot prove that ** ~DD rises relative to DD~ as γ increases, but it does in all of our numerical 
simulations.  A similar effect could be obtained if only the foreign (small) country’s rate of cultural 
discount falls.   Bala and Van Long (2005) develop a model in which preferences in the small country 
evolve towards those of the large country over time. 
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Proposition 7:  Given z≤2/1 < )(γHz , we obtain ∂ R(z,γ,T)/∂ T > 0. 
  
 In the current period protection reduces utility of the representative foreign 
consumer by raising prices of imported cultural goods, and reduces welfare for all 
consumers by causing the number of varieties available to be below the free-market 
equilibrium level of α(L + L*)/px.16  In all future periods, however, the quality of cultural 
goods may increase, provided that the increase in R dominates the fall in the total number 
of varieties so that ñ increases. 17  If the rate of time discount is sufficiently small, the 
welfare of the representative consumer in both countries could increase.  However, this 
scenario for positive welfare effects may be too optimistic if, as suggested in the 
introduction, the foreign cultural goods production that benefits from protection imitates 
home cultural goods and therefore fails to generate relatively scarce ideas. 
 
IV. Imitative Cultural Production 
In this section, we introduce the possibility of imitative cultural production into 
our model.  Imitative cultural production is defined as the production of cultural goods 
that share the cultural discount properties of domestic cultural goods but the consumption 
network externalities of the other country’s cultural goods (i.e., they are “compatible” 
with the other country’s cultural goods).  Imitative film would be film that adopts the plot 
conventions and cinematic style of the other country while employing domestic actors 
and using a domestic setting.  Imitative music would be music that adopts the rhythm, 
harmony, and instrumentation of the other country while employing domestic singers and 
using lyrics that address domestic concerns and values.  The use of the domestic language 
                                                 
16 This effect can only be avoided if the foreign government spends all the tariff revenue it collects on 
cultural goods. 
17 ñ increases with T in all of our numerical simulations. 
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by the actors or singers in imitative cultural goods would be the most important element 
in maintaining the cultural discount properties of domestic cultural goods, whereas the 
adoption of core features of the other country’s cultural goods would allow imitative 
films to be part of the same “conversation” as the other country’s films and imitative 
music to be programmed with the other country’s music at parties and on the radio.  It is 
important to emphasize that imitative cultural production in no way involves violation of 
intellectual property laws, and we continue to maintain our assumption that intellectual 
property rights are fully protected. 
There are now potentially two types of cultural goods being produced in each 
country.  For clarity, we will refer to the cultural goods already present in the model of 
the previous section as “traditional” as opposed to “imitative.”  We assume that the fixed 
cost of producing imitative cultural goods is a multiple λ > 1 of the fixed cost of 
producing traditional cultural goods, reflecting the costs to domestic producers of 
adopting the unfamiliar features of the other country’s cultural goods.18   
We begin our analysis maintaining the assumption of consumer homogeneity 
within each country.  Moreover, we provisionally assume that in equilibrium imitative 
cultural production occurs only in the foreign country.  Denoting foreign imitative goods 
by an overbar, we then write home and foreign demands using equations (13) and (14), 
respectively: 
( ) ,~~)( 111111
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σσ
−−−−−−
−−
++
=  
                                                 
18 The marginal costs of producing the physical film or CD are presumably the same for both types of 
cultural goods, though the marginal costs of imitative cultural goods could also be higher if, for example, it 
was necessary to hire supporting artists from the other country and pay them royalties. 
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where for simplicity we again assume that the foreign government spends all the tariff 
revenue it collects on the homogeneous good. 
Since foreign imitative goods are compatible with home goods, we write 
consumption network externalities as follows: 
)],()([ ** DDnDDnHH γγ +++≡ )],~~(~[~ *DDnHH γ+≡  
 )],()([ *** DDnDDnHH +++≡ γγ )].~~(~[~ ** DDnHH +≡ γ    (15) 
We also need to make a similar change in the equation for cultural goods quality 
reflecting that imitative goods are perfect substitutes for home goods in its production:  
).~,( 111 −−− += ττττ nnnQQ         (16) 
A sufficient condition for existence of foreign imitative production in equilibrium 
is that entry by foreign producers of imitative goods is possible when the foreign country 
is completely specialized in traditional production, i.e., in the equilibrium studied in the 
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previous section.  The condition for successful entry of imitative goods producers is 
easily shown to be xDD λ≥+ * , where D  and *D are evaluated at the equilibrium 
without imitative production.  Since D~ + D~ * = x, this condition can be rewritten as 
)~~( *
*
DDDD +≥+ λ .  It is then easily shown that this condition must hold if ( HH ~ )σ-1 ≥ 
λ and ( ** ~HH )σ-1 ≥ λ, where the H’s are evaluated at n = 0.  Intuitively, it is profitable 
to introduce imitative production when its consumption network externalities are 
sufficiently high relative to those of traditional production to offset its higher cost.  The 
home market effect, by causing n > ñ in equilibrium, tends to support introduction of 
imitative production by making HH ~ and ** ~HH larger, as can be seen from equation 
(4). 
Summarizing, the conditions ( HH ~ )σ-1 ≥ λ and ( ** ~HH )σ-1 ≥ λ in the 
equilibrium without imitative production are sufficient to ensure the existence of 
imitative production in the foreign country.  In fact, these conditions are also sufficient, 
provided T is not too large, to ensure the existence of an equilibrium without any 
traditional production in the foreign country and without imitative production in the home 
country: 
Proposition 8:  If consumers within each country are homogeneous, ( HH ~ )σ-1 ≥ λ and 
( ** ~HH )σ-1 ≥ λ in the equilibrium without imitative production, and T is sufficiently 
close to one, an equilibrium exists in which the foreign country is completely specialized 
in imitative production and the home country is completely specialized in traditional 
production.  
 
The intuition for the first part of Proposition 8 is that the consumption network 
externalities for imitative relative to traditional goods in the foreign country are obviously 
greater in an equilibrium with imitative production and without traditional production 
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than vice-versa, and there is no consumer heterogeneity within the foreign country to 
offset this effect by generating a tendency to diversify consumption.  For the second part 
of Proposition 8 we note that home imitative goods would share consumption network 
externalities with foreign traditional goods, which are already assumed to be dominated 
by the consumption network externalities of home traditional goods (shared with foreign 
imitative goods). 
Proposition 8 has important consequences for the welfare effects of protection.  
The reason is that in an equilibrium in which the foreign country is completely 
specialized in imitative production and the home country is completely specialized in 
traditional production, the current mix of varieties between home and foreign no longer 
affects the quality of future cultural production (see equation 16).  Only the total number 
of current varieties matters, and it is easily shown that this cannot be increased by 
protection.  With the ability to increase the quality of future cultural production gone, 
protection must reduce consumer welfare. 
This important point that foreign protection must reduce welfare when imitative 
foreign production has driven out traditional foreign production does not tell us either the 
positive or normative effect of protection in the many real world cases where both 
traditional and imitative foreign production are present.  We conjecture that such cases 
cannot be analyzed with our homogeneous consumer model, i.e., that a country with 
homogeneous consumers must completely specialize in either traditional or imitative 
production.  Although we have not been able to prove this conjecture, neither have we 
been able to find a numerical simulation in which it fails.  The argument for the 
conjecture is simple:  without consumer heterogeneity, there is nothing to counter the 
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self-reinforcing effect of consumption network externalities that tends to drive the 
economy to a corner solution.   
To solve this problem, we now introduce into our model consumer heterogeneity 
within the foreign country19 that parallels the world consumer heterogeneity that exists in 
the form of cultural discounts.  In particular, in the same way as world consumers are 
divided into two groups with shares of world population z and 1-z and each with a 
cultural discount δ , foreign consumers can be subdivided into two groups with shares of 
foreign population µ and 1-µ and each with a “taste discount” β .20  With a less 
developed country context in mind, we will assume that “urban” foreign consumers apply 
their taste discount to cultural goods in the traditional style of their country, whereas 
“rural” foreign consumers apply their taste discount to goods in the style of the home 
country, which includes imitative goods.  Finally, we assume that taste discounting is 
weaker than cultural discounting, so that β  > δ . 
Relative to equations (14), the demands for urban and rural foreign consumers 
must be modified to incorporate these taste discounts.  Urban foreign consumers now 
discount foreign traditional goods byβ , and rural foreign consumers now discount 
foreign imitative goods byβ  and home goods by βδ .  The demand functions for urban 
foreign consumers are now given by: 
                                                 
19 Preference heterogeneity within a country is also important for sustaining diverse cultural production in 
the model of Francois and van Ypersele (2002).   
20 A parallel subdivision could be introduced for the home (larger) country.  However, unlike foreign 
imitative production, home imitative production would be disadvantaged relative to home traditional 
production with regard to consumption network externalities.  If in addition the share of home consumers 
who prefer the foreign style is sufficiently small, the home country will not produce imitative goods in 
equilibrium, just as the world economy will not produce foreign cultural goods if the home country share of 
world consumers is too large. 
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and the demand functions for rural foreign consumers are now given by: 
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The externality functions are still described by equation (15), provided we define 
,*** RU DDD +≡  ,*** RU DDD +≡  and .~~~ *** RU DDD +≡   Finally, the market clearing 
conditions for the representative varieties of home, foreign imitative, and foreign 
traditional cultural goods are, respectively, 
D  + *UD  + 
*
RD  = x, 
D  + *UD  + 
*
RD  = xλ ,       (19) 
D~  + *~UD  + 
*~
RD  = x. 
 Equations (13) and (17) – (19) give us twelve equations in twelve unknowns.  
This model is too complicated to obtain analytical results, but by using intuition provided 
by the model of section III plus numerical simulations, we can gain an accurate idea of 
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how it works.  The two issues we will investigate with this model are the impact of 
increased globalization (a rise in γ) and the impact of increased protection by the foreign 
(smaller) country (a rise in T). 
 In the previous section we showed that, in our model without imitative goods, an 
increase in γ must reduce the ratio of foreign varieties to home varieties of cultural good 
produced in equilibrium.  Since imitative foreign goods share consumption network 
externalities with home goods in our current model, we expect that increased 
globalization will reduce the ratio of traditional foreign varieties to imitative foreign 
varieties when these two types of cultural production coexist in the foreign country.  This 
proves to be true in all our numerical simulations.  In fact, the “import substitution effect” 
of increased imitative production in response to higher γ is strong enough that, although 
the number and share of foreign traditional varieties in all varieties always fall, in some 
but not all simulations the number and share of home varieties also fall.  It is therefore 
possible in our current model that increased globalization will increase the share of the 
home style in world cultural goods production yet decrease the share of home varieties. 
In our model without imitative goods, we showed that an increase in T must 
increase the production of foreign varieties relative to home varieties of cultural goods.  
When imitative and traditional cultural goods production coexist in the foreign country, 
the impact of protection in stimulating production of traditional foreign varieties is offset 
by the differential impact of protection on urban versus rural foreign consumers.  The 
representative urban foreign consumer does not have a taste discount for home and 
imitative foreign varieties and therefore consumes more of them than does the 
representative rural foreign consumer.  As a result urban consumers are more strongly 
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affected by the rise in the price of home varieties caused by the increase in T, and they 
will substitute towards domestic varieties more than rural consumers, thereby increasing 
the demand for imitative relative to traditional foreign varieties. 21  To illustrate, we 
compared the impact of the introduction of a ten percent tariff in the model of section III 
to its impact in the current model.  We chose parameters for the model without imitative 
production so that the increase in the number of (traditional) foreign varieties was 5.0 
percent.   We then simulated the current model with the same values of all the parameters 
common to the two models, plus a ten percent fixed cost premium for imitative goods (λ 
= 1.1), an equal division of foreign consumers into urban and rural (µ = 0.5), and a taste 
discount twenty percentage points smaller than the cultural discount (β = 0.4, compared 
to δ = 0.2).  The number of traditional foreign varieties increased by only 1.5 percent, 
compared to an 18.6 percent increase in the number of imitative foreign varieties.   
We conclude that when traditional and imitative cultural goods production coexist 
in the foreign (smaller) country, protection from imports of home cultural goods is less 
likely to increase welfare by increasing quality of future cultural goods production 
because most of the boost to foreign cultural production is wasted on imitative varieties.22  
Because production of foreign traditional varieties may still increase, however, the 
possibility that protection raises the welfare of all consumers remains.  
  
                                                 
21 This effect in turn is dampened by the fact that reduced production of home varieties decreases the 
consumption network externality for imitative foreign varieties. 
22 Mas-Colell (1999) distinguishes between “protection of national cultural production” (protection that 
attempts “to guarantee that, for example, in the European Union there is a significant production of movies, 
even if they are, in every other respect, entirely similar to those produced in Hollywood”) and “protection 
of the production of national culture” (in which “the intent is to promote the availability and the 
consumption of movies transmitting ‘Spanish,’ ‘French,’ or ‘Catalan’ content:  language, historical 
episodes, costumes, traditions”).  
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V. Conclusions and Lessons for Cultural Policy 
We applied to international trade in cultural goods a model of home market 
effects with consumption network externalities.  Consumption network externalities 
reinforce the home market effect, the reinforcement being stronger for cultural goods for 
which consumption network externalities are stronger.  Increased sharing of consumption 
network externalities across countries also exacerbates the home market effect, so 
increased communication and travel between countries will increase the cultural market 
share of the larger country.  By reducing cultural diversity, this aspect of globalization 
entails an intertemporal welfare tradeoff if ideas of different cultures are imperfect 
substitutes in production of future cultural goods quality.  Protection of domestic cultural 
goods production, actually practiced by many of the world’s smaller countries, may do 
little to preserve cultural diversity because it primarily stimulates production of cultural 
goods that imitate those of the larger country in order to share in their consumption 
network externalities.   
Current cultural policy in many countries is to set aside some percentage of total 
domestic screen time for domestically produced film and some percentage of total 
domestic air time for domestically produced music or television.  These are quantitative 
restrictions, surviving the General Agreement on Trade in Services by the unwritten 
doctrine of “cultural exception” (UNESCO n.d.), for which tariff equivalents can be 
found (at least in theory).  According to our model, it is at least possible that these 
policies are welfare-improving, because they may be increasing production of traditional 
cultural goods that generate ideas with large marginal impacts on the quality of future 
cultural goods output in all countries.  However, to the extent that these policies protect 
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or even stimulate production of imitative cultural goods, they are purely welfare-
decreasing.  This negative outcome becomes more likely over time as increased 
globalization makes imitative production ever more attractive.  In any case, standard 
economic reasoning suggests that import restrictions are an inefficient way to achieve a 
target level of domestic output.  In our model, moreover, replacing import restrictions 
with production subsidies has the special advantage that production subsidies can be 
directed towards traditional production, whereas import restrictions cannot. 
  Our model therefore suggests that cultural policy be reformed to remove import 
restrictions and replace them with production subsidies that maintain at least the pre-
existing level of traditional cultural output.  Since the purpose of subsidizing production 
of traditional cultural goods is to make the ideas embedded in them available to producers 
worldwide, subsidies should be to the fixed costs of production rather than to the 
marginal costs of production or distribution.  The cultural output should then be made 
available to international film and music festivals at no more than marginal cost.  This 
policy reform thus translates into replacing import restrictions with a combination of 
increases in the budgets for national arts agencies and retargeting of their existing 
resources, which sometimes appear to be aimed more at supporting domestic cultural 
employment than domestic cultural ideas (Economist 1998).  The practical difficulty with 
implementation of this reform, to which we already alluded in our introduction, is that 
taxpayers in small countries would be explicitly funding programs for which most of the 
benefits accrue to the rest of the world, simply by virtue of its larger size.  This suggests 
that, in exchange for removing its restrictions on imports of cultural goods, a small 
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country should ask the large country (the United States) to contribute to the funding of its 
national arts agency.   
Our discussion so far has assumed that the national arts agencies that administer 
production subsidies for cultural goods will have no difficulties in distinguishing 
traditional from imitative production.  In practice, explicitly targeting “traditional” 
cultural goods runs the risk of discouraging innovation, thereby stifling rather than 
rewarding creativity and thus reducing the quality of the ideas that are embedded in the 
output. 23  Insofar as imitative cultural production also tends to be “imitative” in the sense 
of lacking originality, awarding subsidies on the basis of artistic merit is probably the 
best practical policy, thereby erring on the side of allowing some imitative production to 
be subsidized rather than risk encouraging stagnation.  This policy puts the appropriate 
criteria for national arts agencies in the hands of the cultural goods producers themselves, 
who hold the real expertise in this area.   
                                                 
23 As its first definition of “tradition,” The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition states, 
“The passing down of elements of a culture from generation to generation.”  “Traditional” cultural goods 
production then preserves those “elements of a culture” that make the embedded ideas imperfect substitutes 
for the ideas embedded in the dominant cultural output.  At the same time, Webster’s College Thesaurus 
gives “fixed” as one of the synonyms for “traditional.” 
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Table 1 
U.S. & National Cinema Market Shares
1985 2002
U.S. National U.S. National
France 39 44 56 34
Germany 59 23 83 12
Italy 49 32 63 22
South Korea 49 45
Thailand 75 23
Notes: Market shares for Thailand are based on gross box office receipts, while all 
other countries' market shares are based on total admissions.  Shares from 1985 
are the earliest available figures for France, Germany and Italy.  No earlier 
observations are available for South Korea and Thailand.
Sources : European Audiovisual Observatory; Screen Digest; Spitzenorganisation 
der Filmwirtschaft; Variety Magazine.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
First, note that yzL =  and )1(* zyL −= . Define the function )(γHz  as the lowest z that 
makes ñ = 0. From equation (9), ñ = 0 implies )1/( zTzTzxD −+= . Furthermore, 
equation (7) implies TxzTzyn /)1( −+=α . If we substitute these two equalities and ñ=0 
into equations (10) and (11) and add the latter two equations, we get an equation for 
)(γHz : 
 ,1
*
)1/()1()1/()( 111
1
=−+−+−+≡ −−−
−
σσσ
σ
δ
δ
h
zTzz
h
zTzTzzf    (A1) 
where the first equality defines the auxiliary function f(.), and we use the simplifying 
definitions: ]/))1(([ TzTzyHh −+= γα  and ]/)1([* TzTzyHh −+= γα . It is easily seen 
that f(0) > 1 and f(1) < 1, and that in the limit where the derivatives of H(.) are 
sufficiently small the function f(z) must be decreasing, since that is certainly true when 
H(.)=constant. Therefore f(z) will pass through one exactly once, and )(γHz  is defined 
the solution of equation (A1): 1))(( =γHzf . 
 Next, we investigate the first value of z (from above) that makes n=0. Without 
going through the details, we obtain a condition that defines this lower bound for z: 
,1~
)1(
~)( 1*
1
11
=−+≡ −
−
−− σσ
σ
σσ
δ
δ hT
z
h
zzg      (A2) 
where we define the new auxiliary function g(.), and define ))]1(([~ zzyHh −+= γα  and 
)]1([~* zzyHh −+= γα . Note that g(0) < 1 and g(1) > 1, and g(z) is increasing in the limit 
of slowly varying H. Again, g(z) passes through one exactly once, and we call )(γFz (the 
solution of equation (A2)) the maximum z that makes the foreign country the only 
producer of the cultural good. 
 We need 2/1)( >γHz  and 2/1)( <γFz . It is therefore sufficient that f(1/2) > 1 
and g(1/2) > 1, or 
 ,1
*
)1/(1)1/(
111
1
>+++ −−−
−
σσσ
σ
δ
δ
h
T
h
TT  and 
 
 .1~2
~2
1
1*
1
11
>+ −
−
−− σσ
σ
σσ
δ
δ hTh  
The second inequality is guaranteed if δ is sufficiently small and H has an upper 
bound that is independent of δ.  The first inequality must hold if these same two 
conditions are met and T is finite. 
Finally, it is clear from equation (A1) that the denominators of f(z) are increasing 
in γ, so increasing γ shifts down f(z).  Since f(z) is decreasing in z, it follows that )(γHz  
satisfying 1))(( =γHzf decreases with γ.■ 
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Proof of Proposition 2 
Since both countries produce the cultural good, the derivation of equations (10) and (11) 
is valid.  Furthermore, under the restrictions that H(.) has a sufficiently small derivative 
and that H is bounded from above by 1/δ, the plots of equations (10) and (11) must cross 
as in Figure 2, establishing the existence of  unique equilibrium values of D and D~ and 
therefore of DxD −=* and DxD ~~* −= .  These solutions can be substituted into 
equations (9) to obtain unique equilibrium values of n and ñ, which must be positive 
given the assumption that the economy is in the region of cultural diversity.■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Suppose that z increases, keeping y fixed, that is, L increases while L+L* remains 
constant.  Then it is easy to see from equations (9) that the direct effect of this change is 
to increase n and decrease ñ.  Furthermore, the indirect impact on n and ñ through any 
changes in D and D~ can be seen from equations (10) and (11) to occur through the H 
functions only, and is therefore dominated in first order by the direct effect.■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Define (with slight abuse of notation) the function R(z,γ) ≡ R(z,γ,T=1).  Let us plot R(z,γ) 
on top of the region of interest (the region of cultural diversity in Figure 1).  We are 
interested in characterizing the shape of this plot.  First, it is easy to see that R(z,γ) is 
identically one along the left edge of the region (where z = 1/2).  Indeed, when z = 1/2 
and T=1, the two countries are in all respects identical and symmetry implies 
that DxDD ~~* −== .  Substituting z = 1/2 and DxD −=~  into equation (12), it is trivial to 
check that R(z=1/2,γ) = 1, regardless of the value of γ.  Also, by construction R(z,γ) is 
zero along the right edge of the region (where )(γHzz = ). Thus, R(z,γ) has the shape of 
half of a car hood, as seen from the left to the right. 
Now cut the surface R(z,γ) just described with two vertical planes defined by 
having constant but slightly different values of γ . The first plane has γγ = , the second 
has γγγ d+= . The intersections between the two planes and the surface R(z,γ) would be 
given by the two curves in Figure 3, labeled ),( γzR  and ),( γγ dzR + , respectively 
(ignore for now the labels R1(z,γ) and R2(z,γ)).  As noted, both curves must start at one, 
and must end at zero at )(γHzz =  and )( γγ dzz H += , respectively.  Proposition 1 states 
that )()( γγγ dzz HH +> .  Given these characteristics of the two curves, the simplest 
possible way to draw them would be as in case I of Figure 3, which would immediately 
imply the result:  .0/),( ≤∂∂ γγzR  Consider, however, the possibility depicted in case II. 
There, in some regions, 0/),( >∂∂ γγzR .  It must also be that ),( γzR  and ),( γγ dzR +  
cross each other at an interior point.  We need to argue that case II (along with more 
complicated cases where the curves cross more than once) is not possible. 
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In order to do so, we plot in Figure 4 the implied shapes for γγ ∂∂ /),(zR as a 
function of z, for both case I and case II.  Note that we can actually calculate 
γγ ∂∂ /),(zR , and that will allow us to see that case II cannot occur when the derivatives 
of the H functions are sufficiently small.  We begin by totally differentiating equations 
(10) and (11) with respect to γ, dropping any terms with higher order derivatives of the A 
and B functions whenever they add to terms with lower order derivatives (recall that the 
A and B functions are just combinations of the H functions).  After solving for γddD /  
and γdDd /~ , this yields: 
,
)(
AB
BDxAD
d
dD
−
∂
∂−+∂
∂
= γγγ  
 .
)(~
AB
BADxADB
d
Dd
−
∂
∂−+∂
∂
= γγγ  
Next, we insert these equalities into γγ ∂∂ /),(zR (which can be easily calculated from 
equation 12), and simplify the resulting expression with the aid of equations (10) and 
(11). The end result of this procedure is: 
 .
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)1()()1)(1(
),(
2xzDAB
zAxDxBzBDxA
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∂ γγ
γ
γ   (A3) 
We cannot sign this expression directly, but we can examine how it changes with z. If this 
expression were to change with z as in Figure 4, case II, then its numerator alone would 
also have the same type of shape, given that the denominator is positive everywhere (note 
that B > 1 > A).  But when the derivatives of the H functions are sufficiently small, the 
numerator approaches a linear function of z (recall that D depends on z only through A 
and B, as can be seen from equations 10 and 11).  Therefore, the numerator cannot 
approximate any shape like Figure 4, case II, while it can approximate Figure 4, case I. 
This rules out not only case II, but even more complicated cases where 
γγ ∂∂ /),(zR crosses the horizontal axis more than once.■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Define )(1 γHz ( )(2 γHz ) as in Proposition 1 to be the lowest z that makes ñ = 0 for a given 
γ, in the case when the consumption externality is given by H1(c) (H2(c)). We want to 
prove that )()( 21 γγ HH zz < . 
Note that both )(1 γHz and )(2 γHz are defined by equations similar to equation 
(A1).  Denote the left-hand side of these equations by f1(z) and f2(z), respectively.  Given 
H2(c) < H1(c), it is clear from equation (A1) that f2(z) must lie above f1(z).  Since f(z) 
decreases with z, it follows that )(1 γHz  satisfying  f1(z) = 1 is less than )(2 γHz  satisfying 
f2(z) = 1.■ 
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Proof of Proposition 6 
The proof is analogous in all respects to proposition 4, and a heuristic argument should 
suffice.  Let us denote with a ∆ the change in any variable when the consumption 
network externality changes from H1(c) to H2(c), for example, ∆D = D2 – D1. We want to 
prove that the ratio R(z,γ) = ñ/n goes up, that is, ∆R(z,γ) > 0. In order to calculate ∆R(z,γ) 
we can use a procedure analogous in all respects to the proof of proposition 4. The end 
result is obtained from equation (A3) by replacing all derivatives with respect to γ with ∆: 
 .
)~)((
)1()()1)(1(),( 2xzDAB
zAxDxBzBADxzR −−
−−∆+−−∆=∆ γ  
Note that for the expression above to be valid, the change in the H functions needs to be 
sufficiently small in exactly the same sense that γ∂∂ /H needed to be small in Proposition 
4.  Hence the need for the assumption that H1(c) > H2(c) but )()( 21 cHcH −  is not too 
large. 
 We can now slice the surfaces of R1(z,γ) = ñ1/n1 and R2(z,γ) = ñ2/n2 with a single 
vertical surface of constant γγ = .  First note that R1(z=1/2,γ) = R2(z=1/2,γ) = 1 (recall 
that if T = 1 and z = 1/2, then the model is symmetric across the two countries, therefore 
ñ/n must equal one).  Furthermore, both R1(z,γ) and R2(z,γ) end at zero on their respective 
frontiers.  Therefore, we again obtain curves such as depicted in Figure 3, except that 
now they are labeled as R1(z,γ) and R2(z,γ), respectively, and we use the result in 
Proposition 5 that )()( 21 γγ HH zz < .  If case I in the figure obtains, then the proof is 
complete:  evidently, ∆R(z,γ) > 0.  If other cases obtain, they would require ∆R(z,γ) as a 
function of z to be too non-linear to be approximated by the function deduced above.■  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 
We can substitute for T(x – D) from equation (11) to obtain from equation (12):  
.
)(~
~
~
),,(
*
1
*
LLDLx
BT
DxLDL
n
nTzR +−
−−
== −σγ       (A4) 
Both the numerator and the denominator of this expression are positive in the region of 
cultural diversity (where both n > 0 and ñ > 0).  Furthermore, we argued with the aid of 
Figure 2 that increasing T will increase both D and D~ , both of which will cause ñ/n to 
increase in equation (A4).  It is also apparent that the direct effect of the increase in T is 
to increase ñ/n in equation (A4).  Finally, we can ignore any effect through the function 
B, since ( ) 1**~),,,~,( −≡ σδγ HHzyDDB  and therefore changes through B are dominated in 
first order by the direct effects considered here.■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 8  
Consider the hypothetical equilibrium in which ñ=0 and 0>n . For this to be an 
equilibrium, we need xDD
nn
<+ == 0~
*
0~
~~  and xDD
nn
λ=+ == 0~*0~ , or ( )
0~
*
0~0~
*
0~
~~
==== +>+ nnnn DDDD λ .  Inspection of equations (13) and (14) reveal that for 
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the latter inequality to hold it is sufficient that 
0~
1
0~
1 ~
=
−
=
− >
nn
HH σσ λ  and 
0~
1*
0~
1* ~
=
−
=
− >
nn
HH σσ λ .  Since when ñ=0, both H~ and *~H  are identical to one, we can 
write these sufficient conditions as: 
 
 λσ >=− 0~1 nH   
 
λσ >
=
−
0~
1*
n
H .        (A5) 
Our goal is therefore to prove inequalities (A5). Let us first show that 
0
1
0~
1
=
−
=
− ≥
nn
HH σσ  ,       (A6) 
i.e., that the consumption network externality for home and imitative foreign goods is 
greater than in the equilibrium without imitative production.  By definition of the H 
functions, this is equivalent to showing that  
 [ ] [ ] 0*0~** )()()( == +≥+++ nn DDnDDnDDn γγγ .   (A7) 
The accounting identity that the representative home consumer uses up his income 
(analogous to equation 7, for the case with imitative goods) implies [ ] pLDnnD n /0~ α=+ = . The corresponding accounting identity for the foreign consumer 
(analogous to equation 8) implies [ ] [ ] 0~**0~** )1(/ == −−=+ nn DTnpLDnnD α .  Equations 
(7) and (8) still hold exactly in the equilibrium without imitative production, yielding: 
[ ] [ ] 00 ~~/ == −= nn DnpLnD α  and [ ] [ ] [ ] 0*0**0* )1(~~/ === −−−= nnn DTnDnpLnD α . Inserting all 
of these accounting identities into (A7), we can easily show that a sufficient condition for 
(A7) to hold is [ ] [ ] [ ] 0*0*0~* ~~)1()1( === +−≤− nnn DnDTnDTn . This must be true when T=1 
or, by continuity, for T close enough to one. 
 This establishes inequality (A6).  We can prove the first of inequalities (A5) 
through the following chain of inequalities: λλ σσσ ≥>≥ =−=−=− 01010~1
~
nnn
HHH , where 
the first inequality is inequality (A6), the second inequality comes from the statement of 
the proposition, and the third inequality follows from the restrictions on the H functions 
and σ that we have assumed throughout the paper.  The second of inequalities (A5) is 
proved in an analogous manner.   
 We also need to show that, for the equilibrium in which ñ=0 and 0>n , the home 
country can remain specialized in traditional production.  Denoting the hypothetical home 
imitative goods with an underbar, an equilibrium with n = 0 exists if ( )
0~
*
0~0~
*
0~ ====
+=<+
nnnn
DDxDD λλ .  This follows immediately since the hypothetical 
home imitative goods share the consumption network externalities of foreign traditional 
goods and 1~
0~0
~ => == nn HHλ  and 1
~
0~
*
0~
* => == nn HHλ .■
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